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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the key issues for conveying the modern normative structure 
of jus ad bellum, i.e. the international law norms governing the use of force, 
is the mutual relations of the treaty regulation under the United Nations 
Charter (the UN Charter)2 regime and the relevant customary law. Contrary 
to as it may seem prima facie, this relationship remains highly ambiguous. 
Obviously, it is strictly and inextricably linked with all the dilemmas and 
challenges of jus ad bellum regulation under the UN Charter regime in all its 
ambiguity. Thus, addressing the character of this relationship firstly demands 
referring to the mentioned dilemmas and challenges. 
 
 
I.  
 
Jus ad bellum regulation is based on the prohibiting norm: prohibition 
of the threat or use of armed force formulated as one of the UN Principles 
(being simultaneously a principle of international law) and enshrined in Art. 
2.4 UN Charter: 
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.” 
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The prohibition has not been contested in principle and it strictly 
corresponds with other international law principles, predominantly with the 
obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means (Art. 2.3 UN 
Charter) and with the non-intervention principle (Art. 2.7 UN Charter). The 
striking feature is that the prohibition of the use of force has always been the 
starting point for all legal argumentations over all major disputes on the 
legality of the use of force. This also applies to those disputes which took 
place after the major changes in the structure of international society 
following the end of the Cold War era as well as those which have been taking 
place in recent years in the face of new and interlinked challenges such as the 
threat of international terrorism on an unprecedented scale, non-state actors 
attacks or computer networks attacks (cyber attacks). The conflicts in Kosovo 
in 1999, in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006, in 
Georgia in 2008, in Syria since 2011 and in Ukraine since 2014 are distinct 
examples in this respect. 
 Obviously, the fact that jus ad bellum regulation is based on 
prohibiting norm determines the shape of this body of norms in its very 
ambiguity. This is because the heart of the matter is determining the 
exceptions from the prohibition, which does not have – as it cannot have – an 
absolute character. Although the UN Charter normative structure seems quite 
clear at first glance, the exceptions remain disputable par excellence. As is 
commonly known, there are two departures from the prohibition which are 
still valid: collective and individual ones, the former being distinctly 
privileged. It is the use of force authorised by the UN Security Council within 
the framework of the collective security system that was (idealistically) 
intended to be the main safeguard of international peace and security. 
However, as the collective security system turned out to be fundamentally 
ineffective from the very beginning of its existence, it is the second exception, 
i.e. invoking the right to individual or collective self-defence as the legal basis 
for the use of armed force, that has become the leading one. 
 The ambiguity of the prohibition of the use of force is rooted in the 
very formulation of the Art. 2.4 UN Charter. From the very beginning its 
scope has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Even if one leaves aside the 
dispute as to whether the prohibition applies to the use of armed force alone 
or whether it also covers other forms of force, such as economic or political, 
the interpretations differ nevertheless.3 By the way, the mentioned dispute is 
nowadays of only historical importance, as the consensus is that the 
prohibition applies to the use of armed force only. Yet, other disputable 
questions remain unclear and result in competing interpretations. One of such 
unclear issues is the precise character of the prohibition scope and its 
extension to the threat of use of force. Art. 2.4 UN Charter is formulated in 
such a way that the prohibition of the threat of use of force and the prohibition 
of the actual use of force are legally equivalent. However, it is not so in the 
States’ practice. The practical meaning of the prohibition of the threat of use 
of force is distinctly less important and cases in which it is independently 
invoked by States are rare. This practical insignificance is, by the way, 
reflected in the doctrine which addresses the issue of the threat of use of force 
                                                           
3 See, e.g. A Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’ in B Simma (ed), Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (2nd  ed 2002) 117-123. 
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in a mostly narrow way – especially if confronted with the enormously 
extensive literature on the use of armed force as such.4 
 The interpretation disputes regard also the meaning of the final phrase 
of Art. 2.4 UN Charter referring to the prohibition of the threat or use of force 
“against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” It is 
unclear whether this formulation allows for the interpretation resulting in the 
acceptance of the use of force which is not directed against the mentioned 
values as it would not be covered by the prohibition under the Charter 
regime.5 Moreover, the issue of critical importance is the ambiguous relations 
between the very term use of force vis-à-vis other key jus ad bellum terms 
used in the UN Charter, i.e. aggression (Art. 1.1, Art. 39 and Art. 53.1) and 
armed attack (Art. 51).6 The Charter does not contain the legal definitions of 
the above terms and their precise meanings are subject to never-ending 
disputes both in practice and in the doctrine. The scope of the disputes is so 
overwhelming that it may result in questioning the comprehensiveness and 
coherence of the modern jus ad bellum regulation and in consequence in 
questioning its systemic nature. 
 
 
II.  
 
All the problems mentioned above coincide with one more, which 
significantly determines how they are to be resolved. It is, namely, the main 
subject matter of the present text: the relations between the jus ad bellum 
regulation under the UN Charter and its regulation under customary 
international law. Does the latter overlap with the former? And if the answer 
is affirmative: to what extent do they overlap? Or whether it is more 
appropriate to speak of a parallel customary regulation which is separate and 
independent from the regulation under the UN Charter? 
Yet, in spite of the persistently contradicting doctrinal views on the 
matter,7 this question was directly and precisely addressed by the 
                                                           
4 Extensively on the threat of use of force see, eg N Stürchler, The Threat of Force in 
International Law (2006) and the literature quoted; see also O Corten, The Law Against War: 
The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law (2012) 92-125. 
5 See generally, e.g. Randelzhofer (n 3) 123-124; T Jasudowicz, ‘Zakaz użycia lub groźby 
użycia siły „w jakikolwiek inny sposób niezgodny z celami Narodów Zjednoczonych”’ [The 
prohibition of the threat or use of force “against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations”] in T Jasudowicz, M Balcerzak, J Kapelańska-Pręgowska (eds), 
Współczesne problemy praw człowieka i międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego [Modern 
Problems of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law] (2009) 115 ff. 
6 Most comprehensively see: T Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter: 
Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice (2010). 
7 Cf e.g. MJ Glennon, ‘How International Rules Die’, (2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 
939; Ph Sands, ‘Operationalizing the UN Charter Rules on the Use of Force’ in A Cassese 
(ed), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (2012) 343; Corten (n 4) 5-27. 
115 Wroclaw Review of Law, 
Administration & Economics 
 [Vol 8:2 Special Issue 
 
International Court of Justice (the ICJ) in the Nicaragua judgement of 1986. 
Thus, the extensive ICJ position should be treated as the natural starting point 
for further discussion. Because of its significance this position deserves to be 
quoted in its entirety: 
"As regards the suggestion that the areas covered by the two 
sources of law are identical, the Court observes that the United 
Nations Charter, the convention to which most of the United 
States argument is directed, by no means covers the whole area 
of the regulation of the use of force in international relations. On 
one essential point, this treaty itself refers to pre-existing 
customary international law; this reference to customary law is 
contained in the actual text of Article 51, which mentions the 
"inherent right" (in the French text the "droit naturel") of 
individual or collective self-defence, which "nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair" and which applies in the event of an 
armed attack. The Court therefore finds that Article 51 of the 
Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a "natural" or 
"inherent" right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can 
be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has 
been confirmed and influenced by the Charter. Moreover the 
Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does 
not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For 
example, it does not contain any specific rule whereby self-
defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to 
the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well 
established in customary international law. Moreover, a definition 
of the »armed attack« which, if found to exist, authorizes the 
exercise of the »inherent right« of self-defence, is not provided in 
the Charter, and is not part of treaty law. It cannot therefore be 
held that Article 51 is a provision which "subsumes and 
supervenes" customary international law. It rather demonstrates 
that in the field in question, the importance of which for the 
present dispute need hardly be stressed, customary international 
law continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed 
by the two sources of law thus do not overlap exactly, and the 
rules do not have the same content. This could also be 
demonstrated for other subjects, in particular for the principle of 
non-intervention.”8 
The ICJ – while referring the right to self-defence – categorically opted 
for parallel binding of the UN Charter norms and customary norms and for 
them being substantively coincident. At the same time it stressed, however, 
that “the United Nations Charter [...] by no means covers the whole area of 
the regulation of the use of force in international relations.”9 Such an 
approach was subsequently indirectly confirmed by the ICJ in the Oil 
Platforms judgement of 2003. It stated that it is necessary for the United States 
to show that an armed attack against them took place “within the meaning of 
                                                           
8 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 176. 
9 ibid. 
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that expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and as 
understood in customary law on the use of force.”10 Simultaneously the ICJ 
stressed the need to demonstrate necessity and proportionality of the actions 
taken while invoking the right to self-defence.11 
The ICJ’s quoted position – which, it is submitted here, deserves to be 
followed entirely – demonstrates the essence of the problem. From the very 
beginning of the UN Charter adoption customary law played a significant role 
through supplementing the UN Charter regulation. This is strikingly 
demonstrated by the principles of necessity, proportionality and immediacy 
which must be met when invoking the right to self-defence under Art. 51 of 
the UN Charter, notwithstanding the Charter’s complete silence on this 
matter. At the same time, the jus ad bellum customary regime was developing 
under the influence of the UN Charter regulation. Yoram Dinstein 
commented in this respect: “[i]t can be taken for granted that pre-Charter 
customary international law was swayed by the Charter and that, grosso 
mondo, customary and the Charter jus ad bellum have converged.”12 Indeed, 
introduction of the prohibition of the use of force supplemented by the 
collective security system created a substantively new legal situation. It also 
pertains to the right to self-defence, which the newly introduced UN Charter 
framework must have diverged from the then binding customary regulation. 
This is evident in the context of linking the right to self-defence with powers 
of the UN Security Council. Also, another legal novelty in the UN Charter 
regulation towards  customary law was conditioning the permissibility of the 
self-defence from the existence of an armed attack – the latter term having 
been in principle unknown to the jus ad bellum regime in the pre-Charter era. 
It was, indeed, a far reaching limitation of the right to self-defence 
permissibility and as such it should be perceived within the general concept 
of the use of force outlawing in the UN Charter. Yet, it should be stressed that 
the precise relationship of the Art. 51 UN Charter and other relevant Charter 
jus ad bellum norms vis-à-vis customary norms as binding in 1945 is 
nowadays of historical value only. What remains of key importance though, 
is the modern relationship. 
The parallel existence of the equivalent treaty and customary norms 
should not be perceived as anything unique in modern international law. This 
happens not only in the case in which a customary norm predates a 
subsequently codified treaty norm but also in the case in which a treaty norm 
and the States’ practice based upon it result in creation of a new customary 
norm or in modification of a previously existing one. The latter process was 
                                                           
10 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) [2003] ICJ Rep 192, 
para 51; cf also JA Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in 
International Law (2009) 27. 
11 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) [2003] ICJ Rep 192, 
para 51. 
12 Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (4th ed 2005) 96. 
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declared by the ICJ as “perfectly possible”13 and many examples may be 
detected especially in international human rights law, just to mention the non-
refoulement principle as highly significant in this context.14 One should 
remember, however, that for the process referred to, the establishment of 
distinct opinion juris is absolutely essential. Without such opinion juris the 
States’ practice of treaty obligation application remains being nothing more 
than that and will not result in creation of a parallel customary norm. 
The tendency that takes a lead nowadays is one according to which the 
role of customary international law for the jus ad bellum is increasing and that 
it may lead to the important modification of the UN Charter in this respect. 
One may even claim that this is indispensable for securing further adequacy 
of the over 70 years old UN Charter and, in consequence, for the modern 
adequacy of jus ad bellum as such. Indeed, the world has changed 
dramatically since the adoption of the UN Charter. New challenges have 
emerged and the old ones have acquired new forms, whereas the UN Charter 
provisions remain the same as they were in 1945. Thus, the evolving 
customary norms condition the further jus ad bellum adequacy. There should 
be no doubts about it. However, here comes the most disputable question – it 
regards the scope of the changes taking place. Does the UN Charter 
fundamentally lose its normative value and become a “paper charter” only, as 
some assert?15 Or maybe does the UN Charter paradigm keep its general 
adequacy and only moderate changes are needed? These focal questions will 
be addressed in the fourth part of the present text. 
 
 
III.  
  
Another important problem which remains separate in itself but is 
strictly linked with the relationship of jus ad bellum norms under the UN 
Charter and under customary international law is the qualification of the 
prohibition of the use of force as of jus cogens character. It is precisely the 
far reaching lack of precision in this respect that is highly problematic. This 
may be detected both in the States’ positions and in the doctrine. As it was 
already stated above, it is commonly accepted that the prohibition of the use 
of force is a principle of international law and co-forms the foundations of the 
international legal order. Safeguarding international peace and security is not 
only in the interest of individual States, whose sovereignty the prohibition of 
the use of force protects, but it also belongs to the interests of the whole of 
international society, as it conditions its proper functioning. Thus, every State 
enjoys the legal interest for securing the obedience of the prohibition of the 
use of force – as such it is of erga omnes character. But the question remains 
as to whether it is justifiable to define the prohibition as a peremptory norm. 
The approach that favours the affirmative answer to this question undoubtedly 
                                                           
13 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (Federal 
Republic of Germany v Denmark), [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 71. 
14 Cf GS Goodwin-Gill, J McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd ed 2007) 201-284 
and 345-354. 
15 Cf RJ Delahunty, ‘Paper Charter: Self-Defense and the Failure of the United Nations 
Collective Security System’ (2006-2007) 56 Catholic University Law Review 871. 
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prevails in the international law scholarship.16 The ICJ’s position in this 
respect definitely contributed to the formation of such an approach. The ICJ 
quoted in its Nicaragua judgement the position of the International Law 
Commission of 1966 and stated that “the law of the Charter concerning the 
prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a 
rule in international law having the character of jus cogens.”17 Yet, it seems 
that it would be more adequate to refer to the reflection of relevant customary 
norms in the UN Charter norms – since the normative power of jus cogens, 
which must be rooted – as it is submitted here – in the positive international 
law, should be derived from the universal customary norms.18 Jus cogens as 
the norm defined according to the definition of Art. 53 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties19 must be of a qualified international 
custom character, i.e. in the sense of a qualified opinion juris: “a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole.” 
 The ICJ in the Nicaragua judgement referred also to the concurring 
positions of the parties, i.e. Nicaragua and the United States, in this respect.20 
That is why Cezary Mik claimed that such an ICJ position should be qualified 
as “soft.”21 Indeed, it is characteristic that the ICJ in its Congo judgement 
limited itself to the statement that “the prohibition against the use of force is 
a cornerstone of the United Nations Charter” and it did not refer to the 
peremptory character of the prohibition.22 
The approach towards qualification of the prohibition of the use of 
force as jus conges does not remain unchallenged.23 Some doubts in this 
respect – at least as far as the precision of the approach is concerned – are 
being raised also by some of the ICJ judges. One can mention for example 
the characteristic position of the former president of the ICJ, Dame Rosalyn 
Higgins, who stated: 
"In Oil Platforms case some judges viewed the application 
of norms relating to the use of force as having this special 
character, and for this reason among others, displacing the 
more obvious applicable law. It seems to me self-evident 
                                                           
16 For the representative range of views see Corten (n 4) 200-213 and the literature quoted. 
17 Respectively: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 190 and (1966-II) International 
Law Commission Yearbook 247. 
18 Yet, the general principle of law may be also viewed as a normative source of a peremptory 
norm. Cf C Mik, ‘Ius cogens we współczesnym prawie międzynarodowym’ [Jus Cogens in 
Modern International Law] in A Wnukiewicz-Kozłowska (ed), Aksjologia współczesnego 
prawa międzynarodowego [Axiology of Modern International Law] (2011) 219. 
19 1155 UNTS 331. 
20 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para. 190. 
21 Mik (n 18) 225. 
22 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 148. 
23 See, e.g.: JA Green, ‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of 
Force’ (2011) 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 215. 
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that the use of force, when it is prohibited in the 
circumstances of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter but 
permitted in the circumstances of Article 51 of the Charter, 
lacks the character of a jus cogens provision that without 
more sets aside a different specific, applicable law.”24 
What is also very characteristic in this respect is that the doctrinal 
positions submitting the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of 
force are commonly of declaratory character only and they are seldom 
accompanied by the relevant elaborated justification of such a claim.25 
Meanwhile the critical approach to this claim may result in some serious 
doubts, indeed. James A. Green points out three main arguments which lead 
to questioning the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force: 1) 
the imprecise scope of the prohibition; 2) the substantive exceptions from the 
prohibition; 3) and the evolving character of jus ad bellum norms which are 
subject to dynamic changes. 26 
The approach which allows the handling of the above arguments is the 
interpretation (consistently submitted by the present author), according to 
which every instance of resorting to armed force without the authorization of 
the UN Security Council or outside the framework of the right to self-defence 
constitutes an act of illegal use of force, ergo an act of aggression understood 
as such.27 Such an approach safeguards the necessary precision of the 
prohibition. In consequence it is the prohibition of aggression (illegal use of 
force) which gains the peremptory status. The prohibition of aggression, 
understood in this way, remains unequivocal and provides for no exceptions. 
However, the scope of the prohibition of the use force, i.e. the scope of the 
exceptions would be form by the jus ad bellum norms which could undergo 
modifications and which would not have peremptory status themselves. 
In light of modern States’ practice and serious disputes regarding the 
legality of indeed all armed conflicts of the previous decades, it seems 
obvious that international society as a whole accepts and recognises that the 
use of armed force is regulated by international law norms and that 
aggression, understood as any use of armed force which these norms do not 
provide for, is an illegal act and constitutes the most serious violation of 
international law. At the same time States differ fundamentally in their 
assessment regarding the precise content of international law norms 
                                                           
24 R Higgins, ‘A Just World Order Under Law. Plenary Address’ in P Rogers (ed) Themes 
and Theories (2009) 1292. 
25 With the commendable exception of Olivier Corten’s argumentation, Corten (n 4) 200-
213. 
26 Green (n 23) 225-241. 
27 An act of aggression would be also equated with an armed attack. This approach obviously 
goes against the overwhelmingly dominant position based on the gravity as the criterion for 
legal qualification of an act of illegal use of armed force. Yet, the gravity remains crucial but 
in different aspects as it is decisive in: 1) (discretional) determining the existence of an act of 
aggression by the UN Security Council under Art. 39 UN Charter (i.e. not every act of 
aggression understood as any illegal use of armed force would necessarily constitute the act 
of aggression under art. 39 UN Charter); 2) determining the existence of an act of aggression 
under Art. 8bis of the ICC Statute (i.e. not every act of aggression understood as any illegal 
use of armed force would necessarily constitute the act of aggression under Art. 8bis of the 
ICC Statute); 3) assessment of the right to self-defence admissibility in the context of the 
necessity and proportionality principles; Kowalski (n 1) 182-184. 
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regulating the exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force. These norms 
may be evolving through States’ practice which may lead to the creation of 
new or modified customary norms. Yet, it must not be equated with 
acceptance of illegal acts. Also, the approach submitted here results in 
rejecting the peremptory status of the prohibition of the threat of use of force 
– which appears fully justified because of its far reaching ambiguity. 
 
 
IV.  
 
Taking into account all what have been written above, and accepting 
the above mentioned ICJ’s position, one is entitled to claim the principal 
equivalence of the jus ad bellum regulation under the UN Charter and under 
international customary law. One is also entitled to claim that the role of 
customary law in this respect is gaining importance as it may supplement and 
modify the existing jus ad bellum norms. These arguments are also in line – 
as it was submitted above – with the peremptory status of some of the jus ad 
bellum norms, i.e., precisely, the prohibition of aggression. Therefore it is 
necessary to return now to the critical questions regarding the adequacy of the 
jus ad bellum regime under the UN Charter. Is it still appropriate to cope with 
modern challenges and what extent of changes and modifications is needed: 
fundamental or moderate? 
It is characteristic that one can identify a growing number of doctrinal 
positions questioning the adequacy of the UN Charter regime as the exclusive 
normative framework of jus ad bellum which allows for two classical 
exceptions from the prohibition of the use of force only.28 There are two 
leading lines of arguments which may be identified in this respect. 
The first line of arguments consists of views in principle questioning 
and denying the binding force of the UN Charter norms regulating the use of 
armed force. Such views are presented especially by some American authors 
with Michael J. Glennon being one of most influential and characteristic 
among them.29 While criticising the very normative structure adopted under 
                                                           
28 Such tendency is obviously not typical for modern doctrinal positions only – one may refer 
to the example of the famous polemic in this regard between Thomas Franck and Louis 
Henkin: Th M Franck, ‘Who Killed Art. 2(4)? Or: The Changing Norms Governing the Use 
of Force by States’ (1970) 64 American Journal of International Law 809 ff and L Henkin, 
‘The Reports of The Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated’ (1971) 65 American 
Journal of International Law 809. 
29 See e.g: MJ Glennon, ‘The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence and Incoherence in Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter’ (2002) 25 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 539; 
MJ Glennon, ‘The Rise and Fall of the U.N. Charter’s Use of Force Rules’ (2003-2004) 27 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 497; MJ Glennon (n 7) 939; MJ 
Glennon, ‘The Emerging Use-of-Force Paradigm’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law 309; cf RJ Delahunty (n 15); RJ Delahunty, J Yoo, ‘Great Power Security’ (2009-2010) 
10 Chicago Journal of International Law 35. 
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the UN Charter,30 he claims that because of continuous and wide violations 
by States of the UN Charter norms on use of force, they lost, in consequence, 
their binding force and remain “paper” only. 
Michael J. Glennon argues in this context that “excessive violation of 
a rule, whether embodied in custom or treaty, causes the rule to be replaced 
by another rule that permits unrestricted freedom of action.”31 However, the 
evident weakness of this kind of argumentation is lack of necessary 
demonstration of relevant States’ practice accompanied by opinion juris. This 
is crucial because – as Rudolf Bernhardt pointed out – “the disappearance of 
a customary norm and its replacement by a new norm require again 
widespread acceptance in the international community.”32 And Michael J. 
Glennon limits himself to invoking in this respect the practice of the United 
States, especially in context of 2003 intervention in Iraq, and to examples of 
statements of the representatives of the American administration who claim 
the right of the United States to take all measures deemed to be necessary to 
defend their interests.33 By the way, he does it with no distinction whatsoever 
between political and/or ethical argumentation and argumentation of strictly 
legal character. 
Contrary to Michael J. Glennon’s views, it is out of question that 
States – including the United States – act within the international legal 
framework with strict reference to the jus ad bellum regime under the UN 
Charter.34 Even in cases in which they are violated – and it happens repeatedly 
– States make efforts to submit such an interpretation which would justify the 
actions taken under the existing legal framework. Thus, Michael J. Glennon’s 
views do not reflect the present character of the legal order. Yet, they do 
reflect the potential of its further evolution with all mostly dangerous 
consequences. It is impossible to exclude that the process of the weakening 
of the prohibition of the use of force will continue in future. This assumption 
leads to the conclusion that, while facing new threats and tendencies in the 
States’ practice, it is necessary to remodel, to some extent, the modern regime 
of jus ad bellum. The alternative for such changes is a return to the legal 
regime of pre-Charter era, i.e. to the period before the introduction of the 
prohibition of the use of force accompanied by the collective security 
system.35 This would be a return to the state of affairs in which the modern 
world – according to Michael J. Glennon’s yet unjustified claims – already is 
                                                           
30 For critique of Art. 51 UN Charter structure see: MJ Glennon, ‘The Fog…’ (n 29) 541-
549. 
31 Glennon, ‘How International’ (n 7) 940. 
32 R Bernhardt, ‘Customary International Law’ in R Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (1992) 901. 
33 See especially MJ Glennon, ‘The Rise’ (n 29) 508 and the famous statement of the US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell of 27 January 2003 quoted there: “We continue to reserve 
our sovereign right to take military action against Iraq alone or in a coalition of the willing.” 
34 JA Frowein, ‘Is Public International Law Dead?’(2003) 43 German Yearbook of 
International Law 10-11. 
35 W Czapliński, ‘Reforma ONZ – zasady użycia siły zbrojnej w stosunkach 
międzynarodowych’ [The Reform of the UN – Principles of the Use of Force in International 
Relations] in J Symonides (ed), Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych – bilans i perspektywy 
[The United Nations – The Balance and Perspectives] (2006) 677; Corten (n 4) 552. 
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and in which “regulation of the use of force internationally remains primarily 
a political and not a legal matter.”36 
The other line of arguments questioning the adequacy of the UN 
Charter use of force regime as the exclusive normative framework of jus ad 
bellum aims, not at denying the binding force of the UN Charter regulations 
but, at demonstrating their limited scope of application linked with co-
existing customary regulation. The latter is not to be the reflection of the UN 
Charter regulation but it is to be much more extensive and to allow for the use 
of force by States beyond the classical exceptions of the UN Security Council 
authorisation and the right to self-defence. According to this line of 
argumentation, there are legal customary bases in modern international law 
for such exceptions from the prohibition of the use of force as the right to 
humanitarian intervention, pre-emptive (or even preventive) self-defence or 
the right to self-defence against non-state actors at the territory of another 
State. Thus, as far as the right to self-defence is concerned, there is to be its 
legal customary regulation far beyond the Art. 51 UN Charter and its 
customary equivalent norm. This kind of argumentation is not new. As far 
back as in 1958 Derek W. Bowett stated – while referring to the argument 
that after the adoption of the UN Charter every individual use of force by a 
UN Member State, beyond the self-defence being the response to an armed 
attack, is illegal – that “this statement is inaccurate and misleading, for the 
relevant prohibition is Art. 2(4) which contains no prohibition of the exercise 
of self-defence as permitted under the general law; moreover it is quite 
certain that under the general law the right was not limited to cases of an 
armed attack.”37 The views of Yoram Dinstein38 may be placed among the 
same line of arguments, as he refers, e.g., to the concept of “extraterritorial 
law enforcement” for legalising the use of force by a State against non-state 
actors and in response to their previous independent armed activities from the 
territory of a third State without its consent.39 Dinstein argues that this kind 
of use of force is legal as it is a form of self-defence. Yet, he departs in general 
from the use of force limitations under Art. 2.4 and Art. 51 UN Charter. This 
line of arguments is also generally ready to accept other exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use of force beyond the UN Charter framework. However, 
it represents the same weakness as the first line of argumentation mentioned 
above: it fails to demonstrate the relevant States’ practice accompanied by 
opinion juris. There is simply no States’ practice and opinion juris to support 
the claim of the right to humanitarian intervention40  or pre-emptive (or 
preventive) self-defence.41 And the practice and opinion juris behind the right 
                                                           
36 Glennon, ‘The Emerging’ (n 29) 316. 
37 DW Bowett, Self-defence in International Law (1958) 188. 
38 Dinstein (n 12) passim. 
39 ibid 244-251. 
40 Corten (n 4) 495 et seq. 
41 Corten (n 4) 406 et seq. 
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to self-defence against non-state actors seem to be highly exaggerated.42 Also, 
this line of argumentation results in significant depreciation of the prohibition 
of the use of force and in consequence in returning to an anarchical model of 
international society. 
Both mentioned lines of argumentation can hardly be accepted and it 
is submitted here that there is no basis for substantially questioning the 
adequacy of the UN Charter jus ad bellum regime. What about moderate 
customary changes though? One has to note that if accepting the view that 
customary law may supplement and modify existing jus ad bellum under the 
UN Charter regime and that it is gaining importance in this respect, it is 
necessary to identify the dangerous consequences of this process even if it is 
of a limited and moderate character only. Indeed, this approach may also 
result in the reduction – at least to some extent – of the prohibition of the use 
of force and it also require the detail elaboration of the States’ practice and 
opinion juris. This makes it close to the second line of argumentation 
mentioned above and the respective criticism applies to it as well. 
Notwithstanding, there is a fundamental difference between the 
approaches analysed. The acceptance for moderate customary changes in 
existing jus ad bellum regime is based on the assumption that the UN Charter 
paradigm is generally adequate to the present day conditions with its new 
threats and challenges. Moderate changes – which may be detected in the 
modern States’ practice – would make it more effective, whereas all the 
relevant changes would be saved. It is submitted here that there is simply no 
better safeguards than the UN collective security system based on the UN 
Security Council powers and the strict limitations to the right to self-defence. 
However hopeless this may sound, such is the reality of international society. 
The efforts should be aimed at making the UN Security Council function 
more effectively. As this is hardly possible in foreseeable future it is the 
modification of the right to self-defence that becomes essential. Yet, the 
modification must remain strictly linked to the collective security system and 
the crucial limitation, i.e. the necessary occurrence of an armed attack, should 
be saved. By the way, there is no basis in the States’ practice to claim 
otherwise. 
The consequence of this approach is the need for careful and detailed 
elaboration of any claimed changes or modifications which are to be 
introduced to the jus ad bellum regime under customary law. This leads to 
another crucial question regarding adoption of the relevant and rigorous 
methodology for demonstration of a new customary norm or modification of 
an existing one. Indeed, this is a highly complicated question that is unclear 
in the modern doctrinal debate on the issue. 
The character of the present text does not allow for presentation of the 
extensive methodological approach to jus ad bellum. As I have previously 
done this elsewhere,43 I limit myself to some general remarks only. The 
                                                           
42 M Kowalski, ‘Armed Attack, Non-State Actors and a Quest for the Attribution Standard’ 
(2010) XXX Polish Yearbook of International Law 118-125. 
43 M Kowalski  (n 1) 20-30 with references to the views of Olivier Corten (n 4) 27-49 and of 
Christian Tams and Antonios Tzanakopoulos (ChJ Tams, A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Contemporary 
Positivism and the Jus ad bellum’ in J d’Aspremont, J Kammerhofer (eds), International 
Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (2013)). 
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required rigorous methodology, which may be placed within the modern 
international legal positivism, is based on the process of decoding of legal 
norms through the analysis of the formal sources of international law. The 
strict analysis of the processes of legal norms creation – with emphasis on the 
customary norms – is absolutely crucial. Referring to the classical two-
element structure of an international custom allows – through the analysis of 
States’ practice and opinion juris – for the reconstruction of States’ will 
towards shaping the modern rules on the regulation of the use of force. All 
normative changes must meet the relevant criteria of norm creation processes 
of the international legal order (it might be labelled as intra-systemic 
legitimisation). Simultaneously, the approach of the moderate international 
legal positivism allows for inclusion of axiological values, which – although 
remaining external vis-à-vis the international legal order – may, and indeed 
should, have influence on it. Yet, it should take indirect form, in the sense 
that accepting a particular form of the use of force as legitimised in an 
axiological way does not preclude its legality, but it may contribute to the law 
creation process. The latter will be anyhow dependent on meeting all the 
relevant intra-systemic criteria and they eventually become decisive.44 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
The relation of the jus ad bellum regulation under the UN Charter and 
customary international law matters very much, as it is decisive for the shape 
of the whole regime framework. The relation remains complex and, as such, 
requires a most scrupulous and rigorous investigation, especially as 
customary developments and modifications are concerned. As Hugh 
Thirlway put it: “the process by which customary rules change and develop 
thus presents theoretical difficulties; but it is a process which does occur.”45 
Indeed, one can rightly claim that the moderate customary developments and 
modifications within jus ad bellum are a condition sine qua non for its modern 
accuracy. But there are still the UN Charter regime and the corresponding 
customary norms which continue to govern the use of force in modern 
international society. There is no practice and opinion juris to claim 
otherwise. And those who opt for radical customary changes in the jus ad 
bellum regime due to the alleged modern inadequacy of the UN Charter 
regime should remember that this is the straight way to the diminishment of 
the prohibition of the use of force in international law and thus to anarchy in 
the international society. 
 
 
 
                                                           
44 Kowalski (n 1) 25. 
45 H Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law 
(2003) 128. 
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